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NOTES
ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE: POSTCONVICTION
RELIEF THROUGH SECTION 2255 AND
INTERVENING CHANGES IN LAW
Ethan D. Beck*
INTRODUCTION
Law students, criminal justice majors, and casual viewers of crime dramas understand the basic structure of the federal criminal system from
indictment to trial to the exhaustion of direct appeals in the Supreme Court.
However, this is not the end of the story. After a grand jury has decided
there is sufficient evidence to indict, a petit jury has decided there is enough
evidence to support a conviction, a trial judge has imposed a sentence, an
appellate court has affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Court has
either denied review or affirmed the circuit court decision, a federal prisoner
has other mechanisms available to argue for relief. This Note focuses on the
interaction between two of these postconviction or collateral appeal mechanisms: § 22551 and § 2241.2 More specifically, this Note addresses when—or
if—changes in law that happen after conviction and the usual appeals allow a
federal prisoner to return to court for another look at whether the conviction
is undermined by the intervening change in law.
This Note begins in Part I by providing a general introduction to modern postconviction relief, with special attention to the interaction between
habeas corpus petitions and the § 2255 motion that performs much of the
work traditionally assigned to the habeas writ. Section I.A begins to describe
the debate in the federal circuit courts over the proper scope of the clause of
§ 2255 with which this Note is primarily concerned, the so-called “savings
clause” of § 2255(e). Section I.B relates the importance of correctly construing the savings clause, as well as the dangers of a split in circuit interpretation
for a uniform criminal system. Part II and Part III describe the majority and
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2021; Bachelor of Arts in PreLaw, Cedarville University, 2018. I thank my colleagues on the Notre Dame Law Review for
their meticulous labor in the editing and publication process. All errors are my own.
1 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2018).
2 Id. § 2241.
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minority approaches to interpreting § 2255(e). Part II does so primarily by
describing two Fourth Circuit cases, In re Jones3 and United States v. Wheeler,4 as
they are an instructive introduction to the majority position. Part IV evaluates the majority and minority positions and argues that the minority’s narrow interpretation of the clause is superior to that of the expansive approach
of the majority. Finally, Part V provides a diagnosis of the division between
the circuits on the savings clause, as well as a brief conclusion on the relative
merits of the two positions.
I. INTRODUCTION

TO THE

HABEAS WRIT

AND

STATUTORY EQUIVALENTS

The federal criminal system allows an individual convicted of a federal
crime to directly appeal that conviction first from the district court of conviction to a circuit court of appeals, and then to the Supreme Court.5 After the
direct appeal process is exhausted, there remains the option to collaterally
attack either the imposition of the sentence or the legality of the conviction
itself. At this point, the petitioner is federally incarcerated and is entitled to
file one motion for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.6 Once the
first postconviction appeal is exhausted, a second or successive motion to
challenge the imposition of conviction or sentence must be approved, or
“certified,” by an appellate court.7 Certification is only available in an
extremely limited set of circumstances, and it requires new evidence strongly
indicative of innocence or a new rule of constitutional law made expressly
retroactive.8
In the alternative, the prisoner could file a traditional habeas corpus
petition through 28 U.S.C. § 2241.9 However, this route is rarely available.
When Congress restructured collateral relief in 1948, it designed § 2255 to
supersede § 2241, taking over the work previously performed by the old
habeas petition.10 Thus, Congress narrowly confined the circumstances
3 In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2000).
4 United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018).
5 For a more complete and in-depth discussion of the federal criminal and appellate
process as related to direct and collateral review, see Jennifer L. Case, Kaleidoscopic Chaos:
Understanding the Circuit Courts’ Various Interpretations of § 2255’s Savings Clause, 45 U. MEM.
L. REV. 1, 5–8 (2014).
6 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). As subsection (a) states, § 2255 is only applicable to “prisoner[s] in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress,” meaning it
only applies to federal prisoners. Id. However, there is a parallel statute that provides state
prisoners a similar relief mechanism. See generally id. § 2254. Federal prisoners attempting
to utilize § 2255, rather than state prisoners and § 2254, are the sole focus of this Note.
7 Id. § 2255(h).
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 1 (2020) (discussing the purpose of the
writ); see also Scott R. Grubman, What a Relief? The Availability of Habeas Relief Under the
Savings Clause of Section 2255 of the AEDPA, 64 S.C. L. REV. 369, 371–78 (2012) (providing a
brief history of the writ of habeas corpus).
10 See Case, supra note 5, at 11 (discussing how Congress designed § 2255 to be superior to § 2241 because of the venue problems created by § 2241); see also McCarthan v. Dir.
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under which a prisoner may use a habeas petition to challenge the validity of
conviction.11 The only situation in which a prisoner may bypass § 2255 and
file a traditional habeas petition is when it is expressly allowed. Section
2255(e)—commonly referred to as “the savings clause”—permits a habeas
petition only when a motion under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective.”12
Otherwise, courts are barred from hearing habeas petitions.13
Therefore, given the certification limits on second or successive motions
under § 2255(h) and the barriers to pursuing a habeas petition in § 2255(e),
a federal prisoner usually gets one and only one collateral or postconviction
shot at obtaining a meaningful review of his or her conviction and sentence.14 In theory, this restriction should cause only small problems for most
prisoners; they simply must bring all of their arguments in a single § 2255
motion. Fair enough. But what happens when a change in law happens after
the first motion and the prisoner is not eligible to file another motion under
the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h)? Ostensibly, the prisoner is out
of luck.
A. Introduction: A Simple Example
An example may help to clarify the background laid above. Imagine an
individual steals a washing machine and is convicted in federal court under a
of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Section 2255(e)
makes clear that a motion to vacate is the exclusive mechanism for a federal prisoner to
seek collateral relief unless he can satisfy the ‘saving clause’ . . . .”).
11 Section 2255 is the means through which a prisoner may challenge the validity of a
conviction, while § 2241 is how a prisoner may challenge the execution of a conviction. See
Adams v. United States, 372 F.3d 132, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2004). The validity of a conviction
or sentence concerns whether the sentence was imposed in violation of law or by a court
without jurisdiction. Id. In contrast, the execution of a conviction or sentence deals with
the administrative enforcement of the sentence, such as allegations of a denial of proper
parole, poor prison conditions, or unjust disciplinary actions. See Prost v. Anderson, 636
F.3d 578, 581 (10th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing between attempts to attack the “legality” of a
sentence from the nature of confinement). Accordingly, § 2241 does not generally allow a
prisoner to challenge the merits of conviction or argue that he or she is in fact innocent.
12 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see also United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952) (“In
a case where the Section 2255 procedure is shown to be ‘inadequate or ineffective,’ the
Section provides that the habeas corpus remedy shall remain open to afford the necessary
hearing.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e))).
13 § 2255(e) (providing that “unless” the “remedy [through § 2255] is inadequate or
ineffective,” an “application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be entertained”); see
Cephas v. Nash, 328 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[F]ederal jurisdiction to hear habeas
claims based on the invalidity of a federal conviction or sentence [is limited] to § 2255
unless a petitioner can show that a motion pursuant to that section is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.’ If such a showing can be made, federal courts
retain jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition pursuant to § 2241.” (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e))).
14 See Adams, 372 F.3d at 135 (denying petitioner’s habeas petition asserting that the
district court lacked jurisdiction over his case and reasoning that “§ 2255 is the approved
road for such a petitioner to travel in order to challenge his conviction”).
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law making it a felony to steal a dry-cleaning machine. A federal circuit court
affirms the conviction and the Supreme Court denies review. Next, she again
challenges her conviction, but this time collaterally through a motion under
§ 2255. Again, the reviewing court affirms the conviction. At this point, the
individual has used up all her direct appeals and her first § 2255 motion—
the only one that each prisoner is guaranteed. Barring extremely rare circumstances, the conviction is final.
What happens to that prisoner if the law under which the jury convicted
her is judicially reinterpreted after all the above has happened? Say that the
Supreme Court, or a federal appellate court, holds that merely stealing a
washing machine is not within the scope of a statute making the theft of drycleaning machines a felony. This subsequent change in law means that if our
prisoner’s case was argued anew, she would likely be found not guilty; she did
not steal a dry-cleaning machine, but a washing machine. Thanks to the
appellate court’s reinterpretation of the statute, we now know that the two
machines are not the same. Does our prisoner get to argue that this reinterpretation of the statute applies retroactively to her case?
As discussed above, the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h) will bar
her from getting a second § 2255 motion because the change in law is not a
change in constitutional law, even if announced by the Supreme Court.
Thus, the usual rule that a prisoner only gets one § 2255 motion will apply.
Our prisoner’s only chance of getting a court to apply the new interpretation to her old case is the savings clause. When the savings clause applies, it
operates as an escape hatch, letting a prisoner bypass the limits of § 2255 and
instead use a traditional habeas petition under § 2241. For the savings clause
to work, the prisoner’s inability to get back into court—because of the limitations on additional motions from subsection (h)—would have to make
§ 2255 inadequate or ineffective, triggering the savings clause and allowing the
prisoner to file a § 2241 habeas petition to have her case reconsidered.
Therefore, whether the prisoner gets back into court turns on the meaning of the triggering words of the savings clause: inadequate or ineffective.
The remainder of this Note discusses how two circuit courts have interpreted
those words.
B. Introduction: The General Contours of the Savings Clause Debate
This Note focuses on one of the pathways through which a federal prisoner can get another bite at the apple; specifically, § 2255(e), the savings
clause.15 As mentioned above, 28 U.S.C. § 2255’s savings clause allows a federal prisoner to file a traditional habeas corpus petition through 28 U.S.C.
15 Section 2255(e) has also been referred to as the statute’s “safety valve.” 39 AM. JUR.
2D Habeas Corpus § 9 n.3 (2020) (citing United States ex rel. Perez v. Warden, FMC Rochester, 286 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 2002)) (discussing § 2255 as a statutory replacement of the
writ).
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§ 2241 if a motion under § 2255 would be “inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention.”16
This Note describes the debate surrounding when § 2255 is “inadequate
or ineffective” for a second or successive motion. “It is beyond question that
§ 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual is unable
to obtain relief under that provision.”17 That is so because § 2255(h), in its
so-called “gatekeeping” provision, bars second or successive motions unless
specific criteria are satisfied. Thus, there is something of a turf war between
§ 2255(h), which limits second or successive motions, and § 2255(e), which
ostensibly allows a federal prisoner to escape the requirements of § 2255 and
file a § 2241 habeas petition in lieu of certifying a second or successive
motion.18
It is well worth noting at the outset that the § 2255(h) was not in the
statute at enactment. The weight of authority suggests that, as originally
enacted, § 2255 was meant to provide equivalent relief as was previously available under § 2241’s habeas corpus petition,19 which has been described as a
broad and adaptable remedy.20 However, Congress added the gatekeeping
requirements of subsection (h) on second or successive collateral review several years later as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA),21 an effort to restrict and qualify the availability of postconviction
16 § 2255(e); see also United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 2018). Here
“habeas corpus” is used as a generic term to refer to what would be more traditionally and
properly named “the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum” or “the ‘Great Writ.’” 39 AM.
JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 2 (2020) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)). Historically
these more precise terms would have been necessary to distinguish among the numerous
writs contained under the generic heading of “habeas corpus” in English statutory and
common law. Id.
17 In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2000).
18 Id. (reasoning that “there must exist some circumstance in which resort to § 2241
would be permissible” for a second or successive motion blocked by the gatekeeping provisions or “the savings clause itself would be meaningless”).
19 See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962) (noting that § 2255 “was
intended simply to provide . . . a remedy exactly commensurate with” habeas corpus);
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952) (“Nowhere in the history of Section
2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral attack upon
their convictions. On the contrary, the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties
encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more
convenient forum.”).
20 See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 1 (2020) (“Habeas corpus is not a static, narrow,
formalistic remedy, but one which must retain the ability to cut through barriers of form
and procedural mazes, and the very nature of the writ demands that it be administered
with initiative and flexibility essential to insure that injustices within its reach are surfaced
and corrected.”).
21 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 105,
110 Stat. 1214, 1220 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)). Enacted in April 1996, AEDPA
placed “limits on second and successive collateral attacks on convictions.” In re Jones, 226
F.3d at 330. See generally Peter Hack, The Roads Less Traveled: Post Conviction Relief Alternatives and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 171 (2003)
(describing the collateral relief landscape before and after enactment of AEDPA).
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appeals.22 A crucial part of the debate over the savings clause is the extent to
which the tenor of § 2255 changes through the addition of subsection (h),
and whether it affects the overall availability of second or successive collateral
relief through subsection (e).23
A majority of federal circuit courts hold that § 2255 is ineffective—and
accordingly the savings clause permits a § 2241 petition—if a petitioner “had
no earlier opportunity” to bring an argument.24 The early proponents of the
majority view reasoned that a petitioner had “no reasonable opportunity” to
bring an argument if, at the time of the first § 2255 motion, it was foreclosed
by binding precedent,25 and now the procedural barriers of § 2255(h) would
prevent certification of a subsequent motion.
As articulated by the Fourth Circuit, the savings clause operates when a
retroactive change in substantive law occurs after exhausting a first § 2255
motion, the change results in a fundamental defect in sentence, and the
gatekeeping provisions of subsection (h) bar certification of a second or successive motion.26 Under these circumstances, the savings clause allows the
petitioner to file a traditional habeas petition heard on the merits in the
district where the prisoner is confined. Therefore, the majority approach, in
brief, excuses a petitioner for not bringing an argument that would have
been foreclosed by precedent at the time, allowing the petitioner to bring
that argument through the savings clause once the precedent is
overturned.27
In contrast, the minority view construes the savings clause more narrowly. In this view, the savings clause only guarantees prisoners an opportunity
to test the legality of their conviction; the scope of the savings clause is identical to the scope of what a generic § 2255 motion is capable of doing. A
§ 2255 motion is perfectly capable of determining whether existing precedent should be overturned; in fact, that is one of the things it is designed to
do. Therefore, the first motion provides a prisoner with an adequate and
effective opportunity to test the legality of confinement, including any
adverse precedent.
22 AEDPA also added subsection (f), which provided a new one-year statute of limitations for filing § 2255 motions. See § 2255(f); Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 586 (10th
Cir. 2011) (noting that, through AEDPA, Congress intended “to place limits on federal
collateral review” (quoting Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 376 (2d Cir. 1997))).
23 For example, then-Judge Gorsuch’s argument in Prost v. Anderson rests on a comprehensive reading of the statute that considers “the savings clause’s near neighbor,
§ 2255(h),” and how it changes the meaning of the § 2255 remedy. Prost, 636 F.3d at 585.
24 In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997); see, e.g., Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392
F.3d 957, 960–63 (8th Cir. 2004); Ivy v. Pontesso 328 F.3d 1057, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2003);
Martin v. Perez, 319 F.3d 799, 805 (6th Cir. 2003); Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243
F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333–34; In re Davenport, 147 F.3d
605, 610 (7th Cir. 1998); Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377.
25 See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 610.
26 United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 2018).
27 See Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695, 699, 703 (6th Cir. 2019) (describing the
basics of the majority view).
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For example, the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation in McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc. is that the savings clause only applies
when a claim is not cognizable under § 2255 or when the venue requirements of filing in the district of conviction deny an adjudicatory forum.28
Thus, in those circumstances, a § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective
because it is not an effective vehicle, denying the petitioner even an opportunity to bring an argument. But a § 2255 motion, under this view, is not inadequate or ineffective simply because then-existing substantive law made
success unlikely. The opportunity to test the validity of the confinement by
challenging unfavorable laws was enough.29
The fact that a prisoner did not make an argument in her first motion
because circuit or Supreme Court precedent ostensibly foreclosed the argument does not make § 2255 inadequate or ineffective for the purpose of testing the substantive laws underlying confinement.30 The same is true when a
prisoner brings an argument that precedent should be overturned in a first
motion but does not manage to convince the reviewing court to make the
change. In fact, the minority position would argue that a subsequent change
in law itself—the fact that an individual other than the prisoner was able to
successfully argue against and change the then-existing precedent—demonstrates that such a motion was effective.31 Under this approach, a petitioner’s failure to prevail does not undermine the effective and adequate
opportunity § 2255 provides to challenge the legality of confinement. In
short, viewed abstractly from the situation of any particular prisoner, if
§ 2255 is capable of providing the type of relief sought through a first
motion, the Section is not inadequate or ineffective.
With the basic contours of these two views of the savings clause in mind,
consider again the prisoner in the fictitious example of the dry-cleaning statute above. As applied to those facts, the majority view would treat the adverse
precedent characterizing a washing machine as within the crime’s scope as
effectively preventing the prisoner from having a reasonable opportunity to
argue that she was innocent in her first motion. Further, she is unable to file
a second § 2255 motion because those are only permitted for constitutional
reinterpretations, not mere statutory ones. At this point, the majority
approach would likely reason that the change in law combined with her
inability to file another motion renders § 2255 ineffective as applied to the
prisoner’s case. Accordingly, the majority would hold these facts trigger the
savings clause and allow the prisoner to file a habeas petition.
In a minority-view jurisdiction, however, the matter would come out
quite differently. Under the minority interpretation, the prisoner’s first
motion was an effective way for her to challenge everything about the statute
28 See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1088 (11th
Cir. 2017).
29 Id. at 1087.
30 Id. at 1090 (“Neither [the petitioner’s] failure to bring this claim earlier nor his
odds of success on the merits are relevant to the savings clause inquiry.”).
31 See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th Cir. 2011).
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under which she was convicted, including adverse precedent. Although she
would be denied a second motion, § 2255 was adequate and effective because
her first motion gave her an opportunity to test the law, regardless of whether
she fully availed herself of the option the first time around or not.
C. The Importance of the Savings Clause Debate
The debate between the majority and minority positions concerns when
it is proper to apply the savings clause. However, there is no debate as to
what occurs when it does. The savings clause not only allows a federal prisoner another bite at the apple that would be denied by § 2255(h); it also
prompts a change in venue. Traditional habeas petitions under § 2241 are
filed in the district in which the prisoner is confined.32 Congress, in enacting
§ 2255, funneled most of those petitions into § 2255 motions that must be
filed in the original district where the prisoner was convicted.33 Before the
enactment of § 2255, collateral appeals were concentrated in districts with
substantial federal prison populations.34 This concentration caused “a number of practical problems, among which were difficulties in obtaining records
and taking evidence in a district far removed from the district of conviction,
and the large number of habeas petitions filed in districts containing federal
correctional facilities.”35 Thus, § 2255 attempted to eliminate—or at least
substantially cure—this issue by redirecting collateral attacks to the district
that imposed the conviction. The question arises again then, given this purpose: How large is the savings clause? How many petitions does it allow to
escape the constraints of § 2255 and proceed to traditional habeas relief?
In some respects, the debate is a minute one. It is rare that a case implicates the rival interpretations of § 2255. However, the interpretation is of
obvious import to any prisoner to whom it applies and contains significant
implications for the fairness of the criminal justice system. As Judge Thapar
recently noted, it “bother[s] courts” and “seem[s] unfair” to allow the procedural bar on second and successive motions stop a prisoner from gaining
another shot at relief when a change in substantive law occurs after a first
§ 2255 motion and undermines the legitimacy of the conviction.36 Intuition
suggests that there must be a way to reconsider a petitioner’s conviction in
32 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2018); see also Prost, 636 F.3d at 581 (“[Section] 2241 petitions
must be brought in the district of incarceration . . . .”). See generally 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas
Corpus § 5 (2020) (describing the function and scope of the habeas corpus writ).
33 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (“A prisoner . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Hayman,
342 U.S. 205, 220 (1952) (“The very purpose of Section 2255 is to hold any required hearing in the sentencing court . . . .”).
34 Hayman, 342 U.S. at 213–14 (noting that the “practical problems” of gaining access
to witnesses and records from the district of conviction were “greatly aggravated by the fact
that the few District Courts in whose territorial jurisdiction major federal penal institutions
are located were required to handle an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions”).
35 In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Hayman, 342 U.S. at 212–14).
36 Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 2019).
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light of a change in substantive law, and the savings clause presents a possible
route to relief.37 Yet law—rather than intuition or notions of fairness—must
control judicial decisions of statutory interpretation.38
As such, the split in circuit opinion reflects deeper issues than the surprisingly complex interaction between a few statutes. First, it forms but
another part of the disagreement on the proper role of an appellate court in
the context of habeas and collateral relief. Second and relatedly, the debate
forms one facet of the continual discussion over the proper role of judges in
the American legal system.
For example, in Wheeler, the court describes its role in the process as
being “entrusted with ensuring Appellant has a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate that he is entitled to relief from his allegedly erroneous sentence.”39 Under this framing, appellate courts have a broad role—similar to
their role for common-law habeas corpus writs—to fashion appropriate relief
for those the court deems wrongly incarcerated or deprived of justice.40 In
contrast, the court in McCarthan has a more constrained view of the role of
an appellate court. Given its interpretation of the text, McCarthan finds itself
bound by Congress’s language and reasons that it “cannot ‘engraft an exception onto the habeas statute not envisioned by Congress and inconsistent
with the clear mandate of the Act.’ ”41
As envisioned by Wheeler, the circuit courts have a significant task, which
necessarily involves careful consideration of a multitude of policy determinations as related to the fairness of any particular prisoner’s sentence in light of
changed law. However, while it does involve policy and broad equity-based
decisions, it is not necessarily outside of the proper role of an Article III
court. The question is whether Congress did in fact give courts that role.
Therefore, the debate over the interaction of the savings clause and the
gatekeeping provisions for second and successive motions necessarily draws
upon statutory interpretation principles. In brief, the primary debate is over
the extent to which legislative purpose in enacting § 2255 and then amending it through AEDPA informs application of the text. For example, the
majority of circuits, represented by the Fourth Circuit’s opinions in In re Jones
37 As a policy matter, intuition strongly suggests that some remedial vehicle should be
available. But, as Judge Sutton stated in an entirely different context, “[s]ometimes an
intuition is just an intuition.” Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 565 (6th Cir.
2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519 (2012).
38 Federal judges do not have the freedom to craft equitable decisions that judges
enjoyed at common law. As all students of federal civil procedure will recall, “[t]here is no
federal general common law.” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
39 United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 426 (4th Cir. 2018).
40 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 1 (2020) (describing the writ of habeas corpus as an
“adaptable remedy” adjusted by courts “in accordance with equitable and prudential
considerations”).
41 McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1088 (11th Cir.
2017) (alterations omitted) (quoting Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 5 (1981) (per
curiam)).
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and Wheeler, take the view that § 2255 is intended to function as a mere codification and slight reorganization of traditional habeas practice.42 Under
this understanding, courts retain broad powers to ensure petitioners receive
effective relief and § 2255—other than subsection (h)’s express limitation—
did not reduce the opportunities for relief that were traditionally available.43
The majority approach just described is typical of a dynamic theory of
statutory interpretation, in which courts are considered “cooperative partners
of Congress,” where “part of the courts’ task in statutory interpretation” is
“the protection of social values.”44 The majority interpretation could also be
explained as an example of purposivism, in which courts mold statutory text
to fit Congress’s intended purpose.45 A proponent of purposivism would
argue that legislatures are motivated by a particular mischief and enact broad
language to address it; courts must then expand or contract text to accord
with what Congress really meant.46
In contrast, the minority has a more textualist interpretation, viewing
courts as “faithful agents” of legislative decisionmaking authoritatively
embodied in statutory language.47 Sometimes criticized as blinded by “thick
grammarian[ ] spectacles,”48 textualists hold that legislative purpose cannot
be reliably found outside of the words Congress enacted. Accordingly, the
minority circuits focus their inquiry on the text, trusting that Congress
expressed its purpose such that a careful reading could apprehend and faithfully apply it.
42 In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 332–33 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Section 2255 thus was not
intended to limit the rights of federal prisoners to collaterally attack their convictions and
sentences.” (citing Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974))).
43 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 776 (2008) (reasoning that Congress “granted
to the courts broad remedial powers to secure the historic office of the writ” of habeas
corpus); Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 426 (“Indeed, ‘the sole purpose [of § 2255] was to minimize
the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in
another and more convenient forum.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Davis, 417 U.S. at
344)).
44 Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 110
(2010).
45 See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“[A]
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not [be] within the statute, because [it
is] not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”).
46 See id. (arguing that “frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute,” but
consideration of the circumstances and purposes of enactment make “it unreasonable to
believe that the legislator intended” the result the text requires); see also Borella v. Borden
Co., 145 F.2d 63, 64–65 (2d Cir. 1944) (“[L]egislators . . . do not deal in rigid symbols . . . .
We can best reach the meaning here, as always, by recourse to the underlying purpose,
and, with that as a guide, by trying to project upon the specific occasion how we think
persons, actuated by such a purpose, would have dealt with it, if it had been presented to
them . . . .”). But see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 39 (2012) (arguing that perceived statutory “imperfection is [often]
the consequence of a compromise that it is not the function of the courts to upset—or to
make impossible for the future by disregarding the words adopted”).
47 See Barrett, supra note 44, at 110.
48 W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In addition, the availability of collateral relief touches sensitive policy
debates over the appropriate balance between finality and error correction in
criminal justice. The delicate equipoise between these two interests is particularly salient for successive motions and habeas petitions, as collateral attacks
on convictions “undermine society’s legitimate interest in the finality of its
criminal judgments.”49 Certainly “the idea that at some point a criminal conviction reaches an end, a conclusion, a termination, ‘is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.’ ”50 The question is where to locate that
point where reopening past convictions outweighs finality interests;51 but,
perhaps even more crucially, the question is who should make that determination in a constitutional republic.
Finally, resolving the split is of great importance as the majority of federal circuit courts to consider § 2255(e) have found the bar against hearing
habeas corpus petitions not allowed by the savings clause jurisdictional.52
That means that Congress likely intended to strip federal courts of the power
to hear habeas petitions unless the savings clause allows it.53 Thus, the
debate is not one of judicial freedom or discretion. Rather, a court hearing a
habeas petition that is not authorized by subsection (e) has exceeded its
authority and is without power to act. Accordingly, any relief granted or
denied by such a court acting without jurisdiction is void as coram non
judice.54 It is crucial that federal court decisions not only reach the correct
substantive outcome but also be procedurally legitimate.
49 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 5 (2020).
50 Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 582 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
51 See generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (discussing finality and error correction in the context of federal review of state court decisions through habeas corpus petition).
52 See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 424–25 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting the split
of opinion among circuit courts and siding with the Eleventh Circuit and the majority
position that § 2255 is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived). Contra Harris
v. Warden, 425 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding § 2255 does not impose a restriction
on subject matter jurisdiction).
53 The Wheeler court makes compelling arguments that Congress created a jurisdictional bar when it drafted subsection (e). Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 422–26 (finding the language at issue similar to other text the Supreme Court has found jurisdictional, and that
the text “demonstrates that ‘Congress intended to, and unambiguously did strip the district court of the power to act . . . unless the savings clause applies.’” (omission in original)
(quoting Williams v. Warden, 713 F.3d 1332, 1339 (11th Cir. 2013))). In contrast, minority
positions draw support from the Supreme Court’s caution against unconsidered, “drive-by
jurisdictional rulings.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (quoting Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).
54 See Coram Non Judice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining coram non
judice as a proceeding before a court or a judge that cannot legally decide the matter, or
more literally as “not before a judge”); see also City of Lawton v. Int’l Union of Police
Ass’ns, Local 24, 41 P.3d 371, 375 n.20 (Okla. 2002) (“A case is said to be coram non judice
when the court in which it is brought has no jurisdiction to settle the dispute.”).
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II. THE MAJORITY VIEW55
A natural place to start describing the majority view is In re Jones.56
Though not the first case to interpret the savings clause or adopt the view
that has come to characterize the majority of federal circuit courts,57 In re
Jones nevertheless provides an instructive beginning. For that reason, this
Part not only describes the legal reasoning the Fourth Circuit employed but
also describes the underlying facts of the cases under review so as to provide a
demonstration of some of the abstract discussion earlier of postconviction
appeals.
A. In re Jones
Jones was convicted of using a firearm in connection with a drug offense
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).58 After Jones filed his first motion under
§ 2255, the Supreme Court decided that the statute under which Jones was
convicted required that the firearms be actually used in connection with the
crime, not merely present at the crime.59 The Court also specified that the
interpretation applied retroactively.60 The prosecution in Jones’s case had
not demonstrated that he had used a firearm during the drug offense and
thus had not met the standard for conviction Bailey required. That much was
clear. Certainly, this retroactive intervening change in law undermined the
legitimacy of Jones’s conviction—perhaps even decisively so. The trouble for
Jones came in how he could get a federal court to reassess his case in light of
Bailey.
One option would be to file a second § 2255 motion. However, there
was an issue with this route. A “second or successive” § 2255 motion must be
certified by an appellate court before it can proceed.61 Section 2255(h)62
55 The majority view is embraced in various forms by nine circuit courts. See Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at 23–25, Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415 (No. 18-420). Though there is
variation among the circuit’s interpretations, this Note focuses on the Fourth Circuit’s
iteration of the majority position as it is among the most recent examples of the majority
view and is generally representative of the reasoning of the other circuits in the majority.
See id. at 23–24 (describing the common dimensions of the majority position); see also Case,
supra note 5, at 53–57 (summarizing the various interpretations utilized by the circuits that
have addressed the issue).
56 226 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2000).
57 The Third Circuit was the first to articulate what has become the majority position.
See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997).
58 In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 330.
59 Id. (citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995)).
60 Id.
61 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2018).
62 Id. (“A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by
a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain—(1) newly discovered evidence
that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the
movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”).
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provides that a second or successive motion must be certified as containing
either conclusive new evidence or “a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive.”63 Jones had no new evidence, nor did he have a newly decided,
retroactive constitutional rule announced by the high court. Instead, he had
a newly decided, retroactive statutory rule announced by the high court.64
The difference is enough to defeat any possibility of a second motion
through § 2255.65
At this point, Jones attempted something more novel. He argued that
his inability to present a second or successive petition under § 2255 rendered
the relief under that statute “inadequate” and “ineffective” within the meaning of subsection (e), allowing Jones to file a traditional habeas corpus petition under § 2241.66 The Fourth Circuit agreed.67 In doing so, In re Jones
promulgated a new three-part test to govern the operation of the savings
clause:
[Section] 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a conviction when: (1) at the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or the
Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to
the prisoner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law
changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is
deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional
law.68

The Fourth Circuit in Jones decided that the savings clause authorizes
habeas petitions when intervening caselaw—like the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey—undermines a prisoner’s conviction; it did so in spite of the
fact that a motion under § 2255 would be denied under those circumstances.
Accordingly, the court allowed Jones to escape the confines of § 2255 and file
a habeas petition.69
63 Id.
64 Jones conceded that, if applicable, the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h) would
bar his claim for a second or successive motion. Nevertheless, he attempted to argue that
§ 2255(h) as enacted through AEPDA was impermissibly retroactive as applied to his
motion. The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument. In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 332.
65 The Fourth Circuit continues to hold this limitation on second or successive
motions, while using the savings clause as a runaround to a determination on the merits.
See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 426–27 (4th Cir. 2018). However, even within
the Fourth Circuit there are dissenters. Before being vacated en banc, a majority panel
reasoned that only a Supreme Court decision could “open the door to successive relief”
because § 2255(h) requires “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive . . . by the
Supreme Court” to certify a second or successive motion. United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d
240, 259 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting § 2255(h)(2)), vacated on grant of reh’g en banc, appeal
dismissed as moot, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017)).
66 In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 331; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
67 In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 334.
68 Id. at 333–34.
69 Id. at 330.
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To reach this result, Jones relied on a theory of the purpose of § 2255
that influenced later courts, particularly Wheeler. The Jones court relied on
statements by prior courts asserting that, as enacted, § 2255 did not constrain
the ability of federal prisoners to obtain collateral review; instead, it merely
redirected that review away from § 2241 and channeled it through § 2255.70
Thus, Congress intended § 2255 to be simply a more efficient tool to achieve
the same end as § 2241. It follows, then, that when § 2255 ceases to be that
effective tool, courts may allow prisoners to use § 2241. Further, because
under this view the essence of habeas petitions has simply been redirected
into a new format and not significantly changed, federal courts retain their
traditional, broad role in habeas corpus of ensuring that prisoners have a
meaningful opportunity to gain relief.71 That is, in essence, the underlying
logic of In re Jones,72 a case that is largely representative of much of the majority view reasoning.73
B. United States v. Wheeler
In re Jones established the modern foundation, at least within the Fourth
Circuit, that a second or successive § 2255 motion can be inadequate or ineffective—triggering the savings clause and allowing a habeas petition—in
some circumstances when the motion would be otherwise barred by the
gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h).74 Thus, in spite of the fact that
Jones’s second motion under § 2255 would be barred because it was based on
a changed statutory rather than constitutional rule, he could pursue relief on
the merits through a § 2241 habeas corpus petition. United States v. Wheeler,
while certainly following the path cleared by In re Jones, breaks new ground.75
70 Id. at 332 (reasoning that Congress’s purpose in addressing the practical problems
of § 2241 petitions means that § 2255 “was not intended to limit the rights of federal prisoners to collaterally attack their convictions and sentences”).
71 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 1 (2020) (describing the common law writ of habeas
corpus as an “adaptable remedy” adjusted by courts “in accordance with equitable and
prudential considerations”).
72 See, e.g., Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 373 (2d Cir. 1997) (reasoning
that § 2255 “was not intended to limit the collateral rights of federal detainees in any way.
It was simply designed to serve as a convenient substitute for the traditional habeas corpus
remedy”).
73 This logic rests on shaky foundations. Jones and Wheeler focus on congressional
intent for subsection (e), while largely ignoring AEDPA’s addition of subsection (h) and
(f). Specifically, whether, by adding subsection (h) expressly limiting second and successive motions for collateral relief, Congress capped all second or successive motions, or
simply those available through § 2255. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2018) (limiting second or
successive motions); id. § 2255(f) (providing for a statute of limitations for second and
successive motions). In re Jones cites various prior cases to support that Congress did not
limit collateral relief by enacting § 2255 but merely reorganized the method for seeking it.
See In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 332–33. However, most of these cases were decided before
Congress amended § 2255 through AEDPA. Id.
74 In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333–34.
75 Wheeler is notable not only because it is among the most recent cases addressing the
topic but also because it demonstrates the resolve that exists within the Fourth Circuit to
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Wheeler presents a slightly different issue than does In re Jones. In Jones,
the question was whether § 2255 was inadequate or ineffective because a second motion was not available for a retroactive statutory decision pursuant to
the gatekeeping requirements of subsection (h).76 There, the Supreme
Court’s new retroactive statutory decision necessitated overturning Jones’s
conviction because the prosecution had failed to prove an essential element
of the charge.77 In contrast, in Wheeler, there was not a viable claim that
Wheeler was innocent.78 Rather, the argument was that a change in circuit
sentencing practices meant that Wheeler had been improperly sentenced.79
Nevertheless, the Wheeler court determined that the logic of In re Jones
was not limited to testing the legality of the underlying conviction but
extended to testing sentences as well, provided the alleged errors were fundamental.80 Further the Wheeler court clarified Jones by determining that a
Supreme Court decision is not necessary; a change in circuit precedent is
sufficient.81
Therefore, after Wheeler, second or successive collateral relief that would
be blocked by § 2255(h) is available through a habeas petition if there has
been a retroactive change in law since the first attempt at collateral relief was
filed and the change either undermines the movant’s conviction or is sufficiently grave as to constitute a fundamental defect in sentence.82 While none
maintain and even extend its position. In United States v. Surratt, a divided Fourth Circuit
panel decided to construe Jones narrowly and not extend it to the sentencing context. See
United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 269 (4th Cir. 2015)), vacated on grant of reh’g en banc,
appeal dismissed as moot, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017). The Fourth Circuit promptly decided
to rehear the case en banc. After the case was ultimately dismissed due to a presidential
pardon, the Fourth Circuit decided to hear argument in Wheeler as an alternative to express
its continued endorsement of the savings clause interpretation announced in Jones. United
States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017) (dismissing the case as moot); see United
States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 421–22 (4th Cir. 2018) (providing a full history of the
Surratt decision).
76 See In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333.
77 Id. at 334.
78 The Sixth Circuit, though a member of the majority, would reject Wheeler’s claim
as not falling “within any arguable construction of [§ 2255(e)] because [he has] not shown
an intervening change in the law that establishes . . . actual innocence.” United States v.
Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2001).
79 Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 434.
80 Id. at 429.
81 The vacated Surratt panel posited that only a Supreme Court decision can “open the
door to successive relief” given the limits § 2255(h) imposes on second or successive
motions. United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 259 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated on grant of reh’g
en banc, appeal dismissed as moot, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017); see Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 428
(disagreeing with Surratt’s interpretation of subsection (h)).
82 Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429 (“[Section] 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the
legality of a sentence when: (1) at the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the
Supreme Court established the legality of the sentence; (2) subsequent to the prisoner’s
direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed
and was deemed to retroactively on collateral review; (3) the prisoner is unable to meet the
gatekeeping provisions of §2255(h)(2) for second or successive motions; and (4) due to
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of the other circuits adopting the majority position have extended the savings
clause so far as to apply to retroactive changes in sentencing standards,83 the
general position and reasoning of Jones and Wheeler is common to the majority circuits.84
As displayed in Jones and Wheeler, the rationale of the majority position is
that when an argument is foreclosed by binding precedent, a first § 2255
motion did not provide a reasonable opportunity to test the legality of conviction.85 Accordingly, if a second or successive § 2255 motion is procedurally
barred by the certification requirements of subsection (h), § 2255 has in fact
been inadequate and ineffective as regarding the prisoner’s claim. Accordingly, the aptly named “savings clause” steps in to allow the prisoner to assert
an argument based on the intervening change in law through a habeas
petition.
III. THE MINORITY VIEW
In contrast to the expansive interpretation of the savings clause’s scope
discussed above, there is also an approach that construes the clause more
narrowly. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits are the primary adherents to this
position.86
The narrow view posits that a § 2255 motion is only inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of confinement when such a motion is theoretically
incapable of producing the result sought. Stated differently, if “a petitioner’s
argument challenging the legality of his detention could have been tested in
an initial § 2255 motion,” then the motion is not inadequate or ineffective
for the purpose.87
Consider how this reasoning would apply to In re Jones. There, Jones’s
motion would not have been ineffective to test the legality of his sentence
because, in spite of adverse circuit precedent, he could have brought the
same arguments that the Supreme Court eventually accepted in Bailey. Thus,
although his chances of success were probably slim, a § 2255 motion still was
an adequate vehicle to test the legality of his confinement under the Tenth
Circuit’s reasoning in Prost v. Anderson.
this retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed
a fundamental defect.”).
83 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 13.
84 There is some variation in phrasing and application among the majority. See Case,
supra note 5, at 53–57 (providing a summary of the positions of the various circuits); see,
e.g., Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that the Sixth Circuit
requires the petitioner to demonstrate “actual innocence” in addition to being barred
through the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255).
85 In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997).
86 See, e.g., McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076 (11th
Cir. 2017); Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011). The United States Solicitor
General also endorses a version of this view in a petition for certiorari to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Wheeler. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55,
at 14–23.
87 Prost, 636 F.3d at 584.
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Further, the motion does not become inadequate or ineffective merely
because Congress excluded that type of argument from being certified for a
second or successive motion under § 2255.88 This interpretation construes
the savings clause as a process guarantee that gives federal prisoners access to
an opportunity to bring an argument, rather than a guarantee of success.89
Thus, when Congress writes that a habeas petition is available when “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective,”90 the word “remedy” refers to an
“avenue for relief, not relief itself.”91
Therefore, the savings clause is limited to situations when a § 2255
motion simply does not provide an avenue for relief. For example, since
§ 2255 motions must be filed in the sentencing court, the savings clause
would kick in if the sentencing court no longer exists.92 Or, since § 2255 is
limited to motions to vacate or correct a sentence,93 it would be inadequate
or ineffective relief to test “a prisoner’s claim about the execution of his sentence because that claim is not cognizable under § 2255(a).”94 In either
case, the savings clause would then apply to ensure the petitioner had an
opportunity to obtain relief through the habeas petition of § 2241.
Unlike the test applied in the Fourth Circuit, the savings clause would
not apply simply because Supreme Court or circuit precedent was “settled” or
88 The question as posed in Prost is not whether a second or successive motion is ineffective or inadequate, but whether § 2255 as a remedial vehicle on the whole is inadequate
or ineffective. Thus, if a first § 2255 motion could have raised an argument, § 2255 is an
effective and adequate means of testing the legality of conviction under that argument,
regardless of the likelihood of success. Barring that same argument as a cause for granting
a second motion does not change the initial determination and make § 2255 inadequate,
rather it simply reflects a congressional decision that finality trumps the possibility of error
correction for all but the most narrow and serious causes. See Prost, 636 F.3d at 588; see also
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2018) (providing a careful balancing between finality interests and
error correction by allowing certification for successive motions on some grounds and—by
necessary implication—not on others).
89 Prost, 636 F.3d at 584 (“In this way, the clause is concerned with process—ensuring
the petitioner an opportunity to bring his argument . . . guaranteeing nothing about what
the opportunity promised will ultimately yield in terms of relief.” (emphasis omitted)).
This contrasts sharply with the Fourth Circuit view that deems the motion ineffective if
adverse circuit precedent renders success unlikely. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d
415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018).
90 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
91 Prost, 636 F.3d at 585.
92 See, e.g., Spaulding v. Taylor, 336 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1964) (permitting a § 2241
motion because the sentencing court to which a § 2255 motion had to be directed had
been abolished, and thus the remedial mechanism of § 2255 was inadequate to test the
legality of the petitioner’s confinement). Similarly, military tribunals are customarily disbanded after courts-martials and are no longer available to test the legality of a prisoner’s
confinement, rendering a § 2255 motion addressed to the nonexistent body ineffective.
See, e.g., Ackerman v. Novak, 483 F.3d 647, 649 (10th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
93 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (“A prisoner . . . may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.”).
94 McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1088 (11th Cir.
2017).
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successful relief would require judicial acceptance of a novel legal argument.95 Because § 2255 guarantees a remedy—a means of pursuing relief
and not relief itself—the opportunity to test the legality of conviction does
not become inadequate when the prevailing substantive law makes success
unlikely.96 Instead, it is the “infirmity of the § 2255 remedy itself, not the
failure to use it or to prevail under it, that is determinative.”97 Similarly, an
intervening change in precedent does not trigger the savings clause either
because the petitioner could have raised and pursued the argument that
eventually prevailed in the first § 2255 motion.98 Under this view, for example, Jones’s remedy through § 2255 was not inadequate or ineffective because
he could have used his first motion to—among other things—challenge the
then-prevailing interpretation of the law under which he had been convicted.
Viewed in this manner, a § 2255 “motion to vacate is not often an inadequate
or ineffective remedy.”99
This way of interpreting the savings clause is supported by § 2255’s history. Congress enacted § 2255 to serve the purposes of § 2241 while avoiding
the crowding and other practical problems that came with funneling all collateral appeals through the few district courts in which the majority of federal
prisoners were housed.100 Section 2255 cures the issue by redistributing
postconviction remedies back to the court of conviction,101 where the case
records are located and witnesses are likely present.102 Since this was the
primary change § 2255 originally made in the existing collateral landscape,103 it follows that the savings clause would primarily operate to correct
any venue snags inadvertently created when Congress switched the forum for
most collateral appeals.104
95 See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018).
96 McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1086–87 (reasoning that it is sufficient that a petitioner have
“a meaningful opportunity to present his claim and test the legality of his sentence”
through “the chance to have precedent overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court”).
97 Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 589 (10th Cir. 2011).
98 McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1099 (“Even if a prisoner’s claim fails under circuit precedent, a motion to vacate remains an adequate and effective remedy for a prisoner to raise
the claim and attempt to persuade the court to change its precedent, and failing that, to
seek certiorari in the Supreme Court.”).
99 Id. at 1088.
100 See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212–14 (1952) (discussing the history of
§ 2255 and particularly describing the burden borne by the courts located in districts with
substantial prison populations).
101 28 U.S.C § 2255(a) (2018).
102 Hayman, 342 U.S. at 214.
103 Id. at 219 (“[T]he history of Section 2255 shows that it was passed . . . to meet
practical difficulties that had arisen in administering” habeas corpus, where “the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording
the same rights in another and more convenient forum.”).
104 Prost leaves open the possibility that the savings clause can apply to more than just
the venue issues Congress likely had in mind but firmly states that “Congress’s purpose in
enacting it surely wasn’t to ensure that a prisoner will win relief on a meritorious successive
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Further, this view draws upon the overall structure of federal collateral
relief to find that Congress “has chosen to afford every federal prisoner the
opportunity to launch at least one collateral attack.”105 This, after all, is precisely what § 2255(a) promises the prisoner. However, Congress, through
AEDPA, has provided more narrow limits on when a petitioner may pursue a
second collateral attack. Given its consideration of finality interests, “Congress has specified that only certain claims it has deemed particularly important—those based on newly discovered evidence . . . or on retroactively
applicable constitutional decisions—may be brought in a second or successive motion.”106
In summation, the minority position relies on textual arguments to construe the savings clause narrowly as a process guarantee and not a promise of
likely success. Accordingly, “[w]hen a prisoner’s motion attacks his sentence
based on a cognizable claim that can be brought in the correct venue, the
remedy by motion is adequate and effective to test his claim.”107
IV. ANALYSIS: THE MINORITY

AS THE

SUPERIOR INTERPRETATION

The split between the majority and minority approaches to the savings
clause is not likely to be fixed without intervention from the Supreme Court.
The Fourth Circuit doubled down on its adherence to the majority view in
Wheeler, squashing any attempt by the Surratt panel to limit the reasoning of
In re Jones to its direct factual context.108 Similarly, the Tenth109 and Eleventh Circuits stand boldly opposed to the long-settled view of the majority of
circuit courts to address the question.110 The Eleventh Circuit—a former
member of the majority—even disparages its prior test as “plainly and palpably wrong,”111 and that of the majority circuits as “pragmatic” and “atextual.”112 Clearly, this is an entrenched split of opinion between the circuits
that will not be settled without authoritative intervention.113
motion, or receive multiple bites at the apple.” Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th
Cir. 2011).
105 Id. at 583.
106 Id. at 583–84.
107 McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1089 (11th Cir.
2017).
108 See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 428 (4th Cir. 2018); see also supra note 75
(describing the Fourth Circuit’s reaction to the Surratt decision).
109 Then-Judge Gorsuch, writing for the court in Prost, denied, somewhat dubiously,
that the decision was creating a circuit split. See Prost, 636 F.3d at 594.
110 The Eleventh Circuit in McCarthan overturned its eighteen-year adherence to the
majority view in an en banc decision in 2017. See McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1079–80.
111 Id. at 1096 (quoting BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 388
(2016)).
112 Id. at 1084–85.
113 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 23–25 (describing the division
between the circuits as “entrenched” and calling for Supreme Court intervention). There
are signs, however, that some majority circuits may be interested in reconsidering their
positions. See, e.g., Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695, 706–10 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J.,
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Irrespective of which side correctly interprets the savings clause, Congress or the Supreme Court should authoritatively resolve the split to eliminate the serious geographic inequities resulting from conflicting tests across
the various circuit courts. The legitimacy of the federal criminal justice system is directly undermined to the same extent that prisoners incarcerated in
the majority-view circuits receive significantly more favorable treatment than
similarly situated prisoners located in the minority circuits.
Though in the minority, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have the
stronger interpretation of the savings clause. Specifically, these circuits give
proper weight to congressional intent as authoritatively articulated in the text
of § 2255 and construct a cohesive framework that makes sense of § 2255 and
Congress’s postconviction relief system as a whole.114 This is perhaps best
seen by considering the weaknesses of the majority position as articulated in
the Fourth Circuit.
A. The Shortcomings of the Fourth Circuit and Majority Approach
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuit’s reading of the savings clause is superior to that of the majority position because a narrow reading makes better
sense of the statute as a whole.
First, the Fourth Circuit’s test undermines Congress’s decision to limit
collateral relief through the gatekeeping provisions of subsection (h). By
using a petitioner’s failure to satisfy the gatekeeping requirements of subsection (h) as a reason to trigger the savings clause, the Fourth Circuit makes
subsection (h) self-defeating and counterproductive.
Manifestly, subsection (h) limits collateral relief under § 2255.115 In
enacting AEDPA and subsection (h), Congress was undoubtedly aware that
changes in law would occur; however, Congress only allowed for second or
successive motions when the intervening change met three narrow criteria:
the change was issued by the Supreme Court, was retroactive, and was a rule
of constitutional law.116 In doing so, Congress created a clear separation
between changes in law that are—in its considered judgment—sufficient to
justify reopening a prior conviction to judicial review and those that are not.
concurring) (arguing the Sixth Circuit version of the majority approach is atextual and
usurps Congress’s role); United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 259 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated
on grant of reh’g en banc, appeal dismissed as moot, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017).
114 While the minority has a superior interpretation of § 2255, that is not to say that the
balance Congress has created therein is necessarily an ideal one. See generally Grubman,
supra note 9 (providing an analysis of competing arguments on finality and error correction). Yet, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ interpretations recognize that Congress takes
precedence in this space, and courts are not permitted to spurn congressional decisions in
favor of a different balancing of finality and error correction. See, e.g., Prost v. Anderson,
636 F.3d 578, 586 n.6 (10th Cir. 2011) (“But whatever Congress’s intent, and even if one
might prefer otherwise, Congress was free to legislate (as it did) that—after one round of
collateral review—finality interests outweigh the interests in favor of (again) reopening
final judgments to permit new statutory interpretation claims.”).
115 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2018).
116 Id.
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Through the savings clause, the majority view attempts to adjust that line of
separation, shifting it to grant additional review for intervening changes
that—in judicial judgment—are worthy of reconsideration. In doing so, the
majority attempts to play subsection (h) off against subsection (e). Using the
failure to qualify for a second or successive chance under § 2255 to expand
relief through subsection (e) defeats the statute’s internal consistency, violating basic principles of statutory interpretation.117 As Judge Pryor, writing for
the Eleventh Circuit en banc in McCarthan, notes, “[t]he procedural bars
mean nothing if they can be avoided through the saving clause.”118
However, allowing intervening changes in law to trigger the savings
clause does not simply upset Congress’s postconviction apple cart in order to
give a petitioner a second or successive bite at spilled apples. It further
requires the courts adopting that interpretation to grant themselves an
expansive, legislative role in defining appropriate and fair collateral relief
opportunities.119 The Fourth Circuit in Wheeler finds itself “entrusted with
ensuring [prisoners have] a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate”
grounds for relief.120 Here, the Wheeler court is describing its role in terms
more suited for the broad, equitable authority granted to courts at common
law in determining the scope of traditional habeas corpus relief and not the
legislatively created and constrained § 2255 remedy.121 For example, recall
the four-part test employed by the Fourth Circuit in determining whether a
particular prisoner’s claim merits use of the savings clause.122 Wheeler, in
order to “honor the tradition of habeas corpus,” reads the savings clause to
apply when, inter alia, circuit and Supreme Court precedent is sufficiently
“settled” and an intervening change in law is “sufficiently grave” as to be a
“fundamental” defect.123 Some elements of the test are easily passed or
117 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 46, at 180.
118 McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1092 (11th Cir.
2017).
119 See Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695, 706–77 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring) (arguing that the majority approach exceeds the role entrusted to courts and secondguesses congressional policy decisions).
120 United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 426 (4th Cir. 2018).
121 See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 1 (2020) (describing the common-law writ of
habeas corpus as an “adaptable remedy” courts expand or contract “in accordance with
equitable and prudential considerations”). However, habeas corpus no longer remains
judicial free rein after Congress expressly redirected and constrained the writ into the
statutory procedures of § 2241 and § 2255. Whatever common-law role remains in the
habeas context is further constrained by Congress’s decision to give precedence to § 2255
and place § 2241 as a substitute. See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962). Further, the supposed expansive ability to grant relief is compromised by the Wheeler court’s
own admission that § 2255(e) is jurisdictional, limiting the Fourth Circuit to legislative
judgment. See Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 425.
122 The court even styles its efforts as “The New Savings Clause Test,” as if to acknowledge that the test is not textually required, prompted, or derived. Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 428
(emphasis added).
123 Id. at 429 (finding § 2255 inadequate or ineffective when (1) “settled law of this
circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the sentence;” (2) after direct
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failed, but others require minute decisions about whether a defect is truly
fundamental or a precedent—since overturned—was sufficiently settled that
a petitioner can be retroactively excused for failing to bring the argument in
a prior § 2255 motion.
While the Wheeler test involves nuanced factual and legal determinations
that may be difficult to administer uniformly,124 it may grow gradually easier
over time as the Fourth Circuit and other circuits that apply it develop a caseby-case gloss on the new test.125 However, whether administrable or not, the
test constitutes a judicial redetermination of when error correction should
prevail over finality interests.126 Each opportunity for appeal, especially in
the collateral-relief sphere, “undermine[s] society’s legitimate interest in the
finality of its criminal judgments.”127 Query whether unelected, life-tenure
federal judges acting through independent circuit courts are the appropriate
decisionmakers for a decision that touches national criminal justice policy.128
Further, until such time as the test’s contours are settled, the lack of finality
creates legal uncertainty and will doubtlessly cause a significant uptick in the
amount of appeals filed directly with courts in the district of conviction to
determine whether the new savings clause test applies.129 Accordingly, an
expansive interpretation of the savings clause results in increasing burden on
those few districts that encompass the vast majority of federal prisoners—
appeal and first § 2255 motion, a retroactive intervening change in law occurred; (3) the
“prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions” of subsection (h); and (4) the
intervening change in law makes the sentence “error sufficiently grave to be deemed a
fundamental defect”).
124 See, e.g., Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 308–09 (6th Cir. 2012) (providing an
example of the intricacies of determining a single element of the analysis: whether a prior
ruling is retroactive on collateral appeal).
125 However, the Eleventh Circuit abandoned its test that attempted to strike a similar
balance to that of Wheeler because, after eighteen years of trying, the Eleventh Circuit
finally determined that it was unworkable. See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1097–98 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting that the test produced heavy
burdens on courts, convoluted choice of law for prisoners transferred from other circuits,
and only inconsistent and aberrational relief).
126 The Solicitor General notes that, in enacting § 2255(h), Congress “redefine[d] the
point at which concern for finality should take precedence over the interest in additional
error-correction.” See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 19–20.
127 See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 5 (2020) (noting this phenomenon as related to
postconviction appeals and habeas corpus petitions in particular); see also Bator, supra note
51, at 441 (discussing the acute societal tension and complex tradeoffs inherent in the
balance between finality and ensuring that “justice has been done”).
128 See, e.g., infra note 141. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2006) (discussing the appropriate balance between the
executive, legislative, and executive branches in criminal law).
129 In moving away from such a test, the Eleventh Circuit notes that it “placed a heavy
burden” on district courts, leading “perhaps thousands[ ] of prisoners” to file “petitions
citing [the test] in the various districts where federal prisons are located,” which “required
wardens to defend decades-old sentence determinations and resurrected the exact
problems that Congress attempted to solve when it created [§ 2255].” McCarthan, 851 F.3d
at 1098.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-5\NDL508.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 23

adequate and effective

8-JUN-20

9:17

2085

exactly the incongruity Congress attempted to eliminate by enacting
§ 2255.130
Second and similarly, interpreting intervening changes in statutory law
as sufficient to escape the constraints of § 2255(h) eliminates the statute of
limitations imposed in subsection (f),131 giving limitless time to press a
habeas claim through § 2241.132 This not only defeats the purpose of subsection (f) but also leads to an odd result. Consider the circumstances of two
prisoners who have both exhausted their direct appeals and first § 2255
motions. Subsequent to those appeals, the Supreme Court announces a retroactive constitutional law decision that applies to the first prisoner’s case
and a circuit court announces a retroactive statutory decision that applies to
the second prisoner’s case. Under the Fourth Circuit and majority reasoning, the second prisoner may file a § 2241 habeas petition. In contrast, the
first prisoner must file a § 2255 petition, obtain a certificate of appealability
from a circuit court in accord with subsection (h), and satisfy the one-year
statute of limitations imposed by subsection (f). Thus, the incongruous
result emerges that a prisoner with an intervening change in statutory law has
a superior remedy to that afforded the prisoner with the intervening change
in constitutional law announced by the Supreme Court.133
Congress decided to privilege intervening constitutional law decisions
made retroactive by the Supreme Court and newly discovered evidence indicative of innocence by making them the narrow exceptions to the general rule
of subsection (h) that each prisoner gets one and only one postconviction
motion through § 2255.134 As the example above shows, the Fourth Circuit’s
test upsets this hierarchy, creating additional exceptions that effectively prioritize statutory claims over constitutional claims—the exact opposite of what
Congress expressly intended.
Finally, allowing prisoners to avoid § 2255 and file habeas petitions
through § 2241 is not a mere change in statute number. It also changes
130 See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213–14, 220 (1952) (noting that a central purpose of moving hearings to the sentencing court was to avoid the “practical
problems” of crowding the “few District Courts” with jurisdiction over “major federal penal
institutions,” as these court “handle[d] an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions”).
131 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2018) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a
motion under this section.”), with id. §§ 2241–43 (describing the scope of the habeas
corpus writ without providing for a statute of limitations).
132 See Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 306 (6th Cir. 2012) (contrasting the one-year
statute of limitations of § 2255 with the lack of such a limitation “for federal prisoners
filing habeas petitions”).
133 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 19–20 (arguing that the Fourth
Circuit’s “construction of the savings clause . . . has the practical effect of granting inmates
greater latitude” in pursuing statutory claims rather than the constitutional claims Congress specifically favored).
134 See McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1090 (“Congress recognized that courts would make mistakes, but provided for successive motions only in specific circumstances. The statute limits
each prisoner to a ‘single collateral attack, unless the conditions of [2255(h)] have been
met.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir.
2002))).
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which court hears the claim. Section 2255 motions are filed in the district of
conviction,135 while § 2241 petitions are filed in the district of confinement.136 There is both a practical and an interpretative concern with this
result.
Practically, the majority-view circuits have to be concerned that those
districts that house a disproportionately large number of federal prisoners
will be flooded by an increase in § 2241 petitions as the size of the savings
clause increases. This potential for crowding counsels in favor of a narrow
construction of the savings clause.
As a matter of interpretation, this result is troublesome as well. When
Congress enacted § 2255, one of the reasons it did so was to redirect habeasstyle appeals away from overwhelmed districts of confinement,137 redistributing them to districts of conviction to address the practical problem mentioned above; disproportionately crowded venues was the mischief Congress
primarily sought to remedy.138 Congress’s statutory reorganization of habeas
through § 2255 and § 2241 prevented districts with large prison populations
from being overwhelmed by collateral appeals and reflected the fact that witnesses, evidence, and documents are located in the district of conviction.139
Thus, an expansive view of the savings clause that directs numerous collateral
appeals back to districts of confinement threatens to reverse the very work
Congress set out to do. At the very least, an interpretation of Congress’s
enacted text that revives the identical venue problem Congress sought to
solve should give a court pause.
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit’s test in Wheeler misconstrues the text of
the savings clause, subverts Congress’s considered scheme of postconviction
remedies, attempts to resurrect judicial primacy over collateral relief, and
unwittingly causes the very harms and venue considerations to resurface that
caused Congress to narrow and constrain collateral relief through § 2255 in
the first place.140 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit was required to step further into the legislative role by developing and inventing its own policy-based
135 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (“A prisoner . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” (emphasis added)).
136 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a); see also Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 581 (10th Cir. 2011)
(“[Section] 2241 petitions must be brought in the district of incarceration . . . .”).
137 See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 220 (1952) (“The very purpose of Section 2255 is to hold any required hearing in the sentencing court . . . .”).
138 Id.
139 Id. at 213–14 (“These practical problems have been greatly aggravated by the fact
that the few District Courts in whose territorial jurisdiction major federal penal institutions
are located were required to handle an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions far
from the scene of the facts, the homes of the witnesses and the records of the sentencing
court solely because of the fortuitous concentration of federal prisoners within the
district.”).
140 See id. at 219 (noting congressional concerns with overburdened district courts with
large prison populations as a primary motivation for enacting § 2255).
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test to balance finality and error correction,141 as well as to limit the escape
hatch its interpretation opened in § 2255’s savings clause. For these reasons,
the Fourth Circuit iteration of the majority test is a less-than-ideal construction of the savings clause.142
B. The Strengths of the Minority Position
On the other hand, the approach taken by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits places proper emphasis on the text of § 2255 as amended by AEDPA as
the authoritative statement of the law, respecting congressional constraints as
expressed rather than expanding the savings clause to reach a different outcome. Accordingly, the minority correctly construes the savings clause as a
process guarantee that only applies in the narrow set of circumstances when
§ 2255 simply does not and could not provide an adjudicatory forum.
First, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits engage in a full and sustained
textual analysis of the text of § 2255(e) that considers the provision in its full
statutory context. They consider each word and phrase in great detail,
employing dictionary definitions, popular usage, and nearby equivalents to
construct a strong textual grounding for their interpretation.
Key to the minority argument is the phrasing of the latter portion of
subsection (e), which states that a writ of habeas corpus is not available
“unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective
to test the legality of his detention.”143 Here the subsection is contrasting
“inadequate or ineffective” with the ability “to test.”144 As Prost points out,
“to test” implies that Congress is ensuring prisoners have an opportunity or
attempt to bring an argument, rather than guaranteeing success or providing
141 As an example, consider the policy judgments required in deciding first that a fundamental error in sentence is sufficient to grant another day in court after having already
exhausted direct appeals and one § 2255 motion, and second what constitutes a fundamental error, as opposed to a serious error, a significant error, or merely a minor error.
These questions have a striking resemblance to the policy judgments a deliberative, legislative body with competence to create a national standard are uniquely equipped to answer.
And Congress did answer those questions when it decided to permit certification for second and successive appeals for new evidence suggestive of innocence and intervening
Supreme Court decisions concerning constitutional law expressly made retroactive. See 28
U.S.C. §2255(h) (2018); McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d
1076, 1090 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Congress recognized that courts would make mistakes, but
provided for successive motions only in specific circumstances. . . . If Congress wanted an
exception for all intervening changes in law, it could have said so.”). The Fourth Circuit,
along with the majority, has opted to readdress these questions through the savings clause.
142 Other majority circuits tend to resolve this issue similarly to the Fourth Circuit; the
Sixth Circuit, for example, imposes a more restrictive standard. Compare United States v.
Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2001) (requiring the intervening change in law
give rise to the petitioner’s “actual innocence”), with United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d
415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018) (requiring the intervening change be a “fundamental defect” in
conviction or sentence).
143 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
144 See id.
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a balancing test that considers whether the substantive arguments are meritorious or the underlying conviction particularly egregious.145 “In this way, the
clause is concerned with process,” not outcomes.146
But what process does § 2255(e) promise? Even if interpreted as a process guarantee, petitioners like those in United States v. Wheeler and In re Jones
who have exhausted their first § 2255 motion and cannot obtain a second
under the constraints of subsection (h) would argue that no process for testing their detention is available to them. Does this make § 2255 ineffective
within the meaning of the savings clause? In short, no. As written, the savings clause only applies when the remedy § 2255 offers is itself inadequate or
ineffective, not when a particular petitioner is unable to utilize it or prevail
under it.147 In using these terms, the subsection is recognizing a distinction
between “remedy”148—a procedural mechanism—and “relief,” what the petitioner hopes to receive.149 Therefore, the savings clause only applies when
§ 2255 as a procedural mechanism considered in the abstract is not equipped
to adjudicate a claim, such as when an issue is simply not cognizable or fails
to provide a forum through a venue-related complication.150 Accordingly, as
long as, say, the petitioner in Wheeler had the opportunity “to test” the legality
of his conviction through the first motion, the subsequent denial of a second
motion does not make the remedy ineffective. Rather, it simply means that
Congress has decided to narrowly limit the opportunities in which subsequent motions are permissible.
Consider, for example, the petitioner in McCarthan. There the petitioner had exhausted his direct appeals and his first § 2255 motion.151 Subsequent to his first § 2255 motion, the Supreme Court overturned Eleventh
Circuit statutory precedent that bore on McCarthan’s conviction.152 Because
it was a statutory decision and not constitutional, McCarthan was not eligible
for a second or successive motion under § 2255(h).153 At this point, it may
appear that § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective for McCarthan to test the
legality of his detention. However, recall that the savings clause promises a
145 Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584 (10th Cir. 2011).
146 Id.
147 For example, that “a particular argument is doomed under circuit precedent says
nothing about the nature of the motion to vacate. The motion to vacate is still ‘adapted to
the end’ of testing the claim regardless of the claim’s success on the merits.” McCarthan v.
Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1087 (11th Cir. 2017).
148 An “[i]nadequate remedy at law” is one “unfitted or not adapted to the end in
view.” Inadequate Remedy at Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910).
149 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (contrasting situations in which a “court has denied him
relief” from where “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective” (emphases added));
Prost, 636 F.3d at 584–85 (noting that “remedy,” as used in § 2255 and neighboring provisions means an “avenue for relief, not relief itself”).
150 See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1088
(describing when a claim is not cognizable under § 2255).
151 McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1080.
152 Id.
153 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
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remedy—a procedural vehicle—not relief. Though McCarthan did not
attempt to overturn the adverse precedent in his first motion, that is “exactly
the kind of claim that a motion to vacate is designed to ‘remedy.’ ”154 This
conclusion becomes apparent when one notes that the intervening change in
statutory law that McCarthan sought to use as grounds for arguing that
§ 2255 was inadequate, was in fact overturned by a prisoner who took the
opportunity afforded by his first § 2255 motion to test the legality of his
detention by successfully challenging the adverse precedent in the Supreme
Court;155 thus, demonstrating that, as a procedural mechanism, § 2255 was
up to the job of addressing and testing adverse precedent.156 Accordingly,
McCarthan had an adequate and effective opportunity to test the legality of
his detention in his first motion.157 That is all the savings clause guarantees.
Second, the minority position adopts a proper judicial role, recognizing
that congressional policy as enacted in § 2255 is binding on courts. In doing
so, this position recognizes more expansive interpretations of the savings
clause as “no more than . . . frank policy disagreement[s] with § 2255(h).”158
As the Tenth Circuit notes “[t]he simple fact is that Congress decided that,
unless subsection (h)’s requirements are met, finality concerns trump and
the litigation must stop after a first collateral attack.”159 Whether Congress is
correct in its judgment that finality ranks above error correction when
neither new evidence suggestive of innocence nor retroactive constitutional
decisions arise is open to policy debate.160 However, it is not open as a matter of law. Courts are not “free to reopen and replace Congress’s judgment
with [their] own.”161 After all, the judicial duty is not to invent the law or
154 McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1086.
155 See id. at 1087 (citing Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 123 (2009)).
156 Id. (“It is unclear why the chance to have precedent overruled en banc or by the
Supreme Court would not qualify as a theoretically successful challenge or meaningful
opportunity.”).
157 Petitioners have the burden of proving that the remedy available through § 2255 is
inadequate or ineffective. See, e.g., Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 2004);
Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 977 (10th Cir. 1998). Thus, any uncertainty in whether the
§ 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective is resolved in favor of finality interests.
158 Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 589 (10th Cir. 2011).
159 Id.
160 See, e.g., Lauren Casale, Note, Back to the Future: Permitting Habeas Petitions Based on
Intervening Retroactive Case Law to Alter Convictions and Sentences, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1577,
1597–1603 (2019) (presenting efficiency, equity, and policy arguments for an expansive
interpretation of the savings clause). On the other hand, placing finality over error correction draws support from an analogy to stare decisis, where it has long been the view that “it
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(reasoning that law should remain settled even if incorrect, “even where the error is a
matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases
involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions.” (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted)).
161 Prost, 636 F.3d at 589.
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ensure it reaches the best result; instead, the judiciary has but the humble
duty of saying “what the law is.”162
Therefore, the minority position conducts an in-depth textual analysis
that interprets the savings clause as a process guarantee rather than a promise of a particular substantive result. This construction places a proper
emphasis on congressional intent as authoritatively expressed in the statute
itself and results in an interpretation in harmony with surrounding provisions, including the constraints on successive motions imposed by subsections (h) and (f). Thus, unlike the majority, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuit
view renders the statute a unified whole: it avoids resurrecting the venue discrepancy Congress solved through § 2255 and also avoids placing the savings
clause in tension with the AEDPA amendments. They also resist the understandable temptation to expand the savings clause to grant increased error
correction, recognizing that courts are not permitted to readjust the congressional balancing between finality interests and error correction enacted in
subsection (h) by expanding the savings clause.
CONCLUSION
While the division of opinion regarding the savings clause will likely only
be resolved by Supreme Court intervention, at present the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits present the best guide to interpreting the scope of the savings
clause.163
The majority, as represented in this Note primarily by the Fourth Circuit, is attempting to respond to a significant fairness concern that arises
when changes in law undermine prisoners’ convictions and opportunities for
relief are barred by § 2255(h). However, these circuits err when they disregard congressional restraints on postconviction relief in favor of judicially
crafted equitable tests. Congress, in enacting limits on collateral appeals,
“weighed error correction against finality and made some difficult policy
judgments.”164 Interpreting § 2255 as inadequate or ineffective because
existing precedent made success unlikely does not comport with the text,
history, or purpose of the provision. Instead, it second-guesses statutory balancing, usurping the role of the people’s elected representatives in Congress.
The minority view, in contrast, correctly holds that the savings clause
only applies when procedural hurdles render § 2255 as a remedial tool simply incapable of addressing the question. Thus, the “inadequate or ineffec162 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
163 The Solicitor General also holds to a substantially identical position but has only
recently repudiated its adherence to the majority view and may reverse course again under
the influence of a new presidential administration. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 55, at 8–11 (explaining the Solicitor’s reasons for adopting the minority position); see also United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 434 n.12 (4th Cir. 2018) (attributing
the government’s changing views to leadership changes in the justice department).
164 Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695, 707 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring)
(arguing that the majority approach exceeds the role entrusted to courts and secondguesses Congressional policy decisions).
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tive” language does not act as an amorphous workaround to congressional
limits on certification of second or successive appeals.165 Rather, it is a narrow failsafe for claims not cognizable under § 2255 at all. Stated differently,
“the saving[s] clause does not authorize habeas petitions based on statutory
claims that Section 2255(h) would otherwise preclude.”166 Finally, these
courts adopt a properly constrained view of the judicial role in postconviction appeals and statutory interpretation. They conclude that—regardless of
policy considerations about the relative merits of finality and correcting
errors discovered through subsequent changes in substantive law—Congress’s statutory limitations on collateral appeals are binding.167 Courts are
not free to adjust statutes to reach outcomes they perceive as more fair or
equitable, nor can they do “violence to . . . statutory text that creates only two
exceptions” by inserting a new one.168 Instead, courts must act as the faithful
agents and interpreters of congressional decisions embodied in statutory
text.169

165 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2018).
166 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 55, at 10.
167 See Barrett, supra note 44, at 113–17 (describing faithful agency and arguing for
legislative supremacy rather than judicial and legislative cooperation in reaching socially
desirable outcomes).
168 McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1091 (11th Cir.
2017).
169 See Barrett, supra note 44, at 113.
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